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Abstract
Crowdfunding gives opportunities to novice
entrepreneurs to raise funding for their novel ideas.
However, lack of monitoring of projects and funds
coupled with the lack of experience of project
initiators create high levels of uncertainty for
potential funders. In this study, we aim to examine
how funders’ decision making process is affected by
different types of uncertainty related to the project
initiators. Unlike traditional e-commerce where
consumers buy a finished product, in patronage
based crowdfunding platforms, funders invest in and
buy a product that is yet to be finished. This creates a
unique uncertainty based on project initiators’
competence. Our results show that uncertainty based
on project initiators’ competence and opportunism
increase product performance uncertainty. Moreover,
the dynamics of project initiator and product
uncertainty are affected by the complexity of the
product.

1. Introduction
Sharing economy is a new form of online
transaction activity that utilizes the contemporary
information technology to promote a more efficient
method for allocating surplus resources [17][32]. By
providing an opportunity for participants to connect
to each other, sharing economy is gradually
becoming a unique but less-regulated economic
activity due to lack of a rigorous overseeing system
compared to more traditional and established ecommerce [25]. The absence of such system creates
unique challenges to participants, especially the
amount of uncertainty they need to cope with [33].
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Crowdfunding is a prime example of sharing
economy activity where participants encounter
various types of uncertainty [6]. As a new form of
fund raising method, crowdfunding has attained
widespread popularity and attention in recent years.
Crowdfunding aims at distributed audiences over the
Internet so that there are higher chances for new
entrepreneurs and wide range of products to be
funded [26]. However, existing research indicates
that investment activities in crowdfunding is mostly
based on herding behavior [8][9][18]. One potential
explanation of this behavior is the high level of
uncertainty since investors have limited information
about the project initiators (seller) and their products.
More specifically, the product that crowdfunding will
afford usually is one of a kind and also yet to be
created if it is successfully funded [2]. Due to this
nature, funders are facing a higher product
uncertainty since there are fewer existing products
can be compared to, and almost no previous history
of the focal product. Therefore funders have to
evaluate the quality of the project initiator and
subsequently infer the potential quality of the product
yet to be produced. As shown by previous research,
product uncertainty is directly affected by seller
uncertainty [12], however compared to traditional ecommerce users whose main concern is whether
seller is honest and ethical (e.g. seller advertises the
authentic product but provides the counterfeit)
[15][28], crowdfunding investors are facing a new
type of seller uncertainty because not only they need
to assess seller’s ethical traits, but also seller’s
capability to produce and deliver the promised
product [23].
We postulate that on a crowdfunding platform,
when funders are uncertain about products, they infer
the product quality via project initiators, they
experience both types of seller uncertainty, which are
distinct and therefore should be examined separately.
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For example, the project initiator can be faithful and
ethical at the beginning of the project, but later due to
the limitation of his/her capability, fails to meet the
expectation, resulting in lower quality products,
delivery delay, or even project cancellation. Parallel
to these arguments, in this paper, our goal is to
explore this unique feature and discover how this
challenge affects decision-making process. Main
research questions we aim to answer are:
RQ1: when funders infer a product quality, what
types of seller uncertainty are they facing during
decision-making process?
RQ2: how the dynamics between different types of
seller uncertainty affect funders’ perception on
product uncertainty?
Based upon agent theory and extant judgement
and decision making research, we propose two
constructs associated with sharing economy: seller
opportunism uncertainty (SOU), which captures
ethical characteristics of sellers (e.g. whether seller is
honest) and seller-competence-uncertainty (SCU),
which captures actual capability of sellers to deliver
services/products. As an example, imagine a project
initiator proposes a new project. Funders may be
uncertain about the quality of the product since the
product has not been created yet. They can only infer
the performance of the product from the information
project initiator provides on the platform. Therefore,
funders may concern about the project initiator
regarding 1) whether project initiator discloses all
information faithfully (SOU), and 2) whether project
initiator has the capability to deliver the product
(SCU) even though he/she does not intent to deceive
funders. By conceptualizing these two uncertainties,
we attempt to provide richer understanding of funders’
information processing and decision making process,
especially how these two different types of seller
uncertainty affect the product uncertainty. We argue
that SOU are SCU distinct, and each reflects funders’
unique perception about seller uncertainty, and
therefore both of them should affect the product
uncertainty. Furthermore, investors are likely to
perceive different levels of SOU and SCU based on
product complexity, such that the higher the product
complexity the stronger the effect of SOU and SCU
on product uncertainty, and the changes in SCU
should be more evident than SOU.
Overall we aim to make two main contributions
and extend the existing research: first, we identify the
types of uncertainty that funders need to cope with in
the crowdfunding environment. Compared to treating
seller uncertainty as a single construct, our research

shows that seller’s competence uncertainty is
independent of seller’s opportunism uncertainty.
Second, we investigate the dynamics between SOU
and SCU with respect to product complexity. This is
an important aspect of the dynamics because our
results reveal that the impact of SOU and SCU varies
according to the level of product complexity. It
should be noted that, there are different forms of
sharing economy activity such as ride sharing,
accommodation based, crowdfunding, and each form
possesses its own unique characteristics.
The
research context of the current study is set in
crowdfunding environment, which is one of the most
popular sharing economy activities. We believe this
context can exemplify the difference between SOU
and SCU, and best serve our research purpose to
explore various dimensions of seller uncertainty, and
the dynamics between seller uncertainty and product
uncertainty while the product complexity varies.

2. Literature
Development

Review

&

Hypothesis

Previous research has shown that seller
uncertainty can significantly impact users’ perception
of e-commerce vendors and the products they sell
[12][30]. Vendors with established reputation are
more successful in relieving buyers’ fear about seller
opportunism [30], and consequently buyers are more
likely to accept and purchase from these reputable
sellers [15]. In other words, buyers perceive these
sellers to be trustworthy, and this sense of trust
between sellers and buyers has been proved to be
very important in the decision-making process
[4][12]. However, establishing trust between sellers
and buyers may require significant amount of time
through repeated transactions [13]. It is probably
even harder to achieve in the crowdfunding context
because many project initiators are novice
entrepreneurs and may not have prior successful
experiences 0. Thus, the principal-agent problem
manifests in such environment [5][24].
In e-commerce, buyers (principal) concern that
sellers (agent) may hide necessary information before
the transaction, or may not act ethically after payment
is received [30]. The main obstacle for buyers to
purchase confidently is assessing the uncertainty.
Here, we focus on two major types of uncertainty
experienced by the buyers, seller uncertainty and
product uncertainty [12].

Page 1810

2.1 Seller Uncertainty
The seller uncertainty construct is particularly
critical in the judgement and decision making
discipline [3] [31]. Our understanding of seller
uncertainty has evolved during past decades. The
advancement of information technology, the
emergence of the Internet and new purchasing
behaviors create unique challenges. In the past,
consumers encounter seller uncertainty in a face-toface environment, and they may infer seller’s quality
more directly. However consumers right now need to
cope with such uncertainty in a much more complex
environment, where purchase can be completed via
both physical and virtual media. In this context,
consumers may not be able to evaluate sellers’ traits
comprehensively, and information asymmetry issue
is even more challenging to uncover [27].
In the current study, seller uncertainty is
conceptualized as opportunism uncertainty and
competence uncertainty. The former captures the
perceived opportunism of the project initiator as a
result of lack of any monitoring mechanisms once the
project is fully funded, whereas the latter captures the
perceived capability of a project initiator to deliver a
high performing product. While seller’s opportunism
uncertainty has been studied extensively in previous
research [29][30], seller’s competence uncertainty
has not been scrutinized closely. Although the
competence issue is prominent in many
sharing/access
economy
activities
[14][23],
consumers may not conceive this uncertainty
completely.
As identified by existing research, in e-business,
seller uncertainty is caused by buyers’ incapability to
evaluate sellers due to the ex ante sellers’
misrepresentation of products and ex post seller’s
opportunism [12][30]. In other words, buyer will
perceive high seller uncertainty when sellers do not
fully disclose their characteristics (ex ante) and do
not cooperate afterwards (ex post) [12]. As we can
see, these two potential problems that lead to seller
uncertainty are both related to sellers’ honesty. In
crowdfunding environment, seller uncertainty also
exists and greatly obscures projects’ quality and
success. However, it is displayed differently in
patronage type of crowdfunding (e.g. Kickstarter)
from traditional online market. First, project initiators
do not primarily aim and “sell” the products for
profits, rather, project initiators are willing to offer
those products at a lower price compared to the future

retail price [20]. Second, project initiators may not
have intention to purposely conceal any products’
features ex ante, because (1) all products are new and
therefore have chances of defects and (2) most
products are advertised even before the prototypes
are created, and are due in the future, thus even
sellers themselves cannot successfully evaluate
products. However, even though sellers in
crowdfunding contexts may not have the motivation
to hide important information, the potential ex ante
peril still exists since sellers may be too optimistic
about their capabilities and products’ performance.
Therefore, this uncertainty is not due to seller’s
dishonesty but rather it is due to seller’s competence.
This unique uncertainty is in addition to seller’s
opportunism uncertainty, which exists in traditional
online markets [16], since project initiators may be
shirking after their projects are fully funded, which
results in low quality end products.
To summarize, in crowdfunding context, seller
uncertainty has two distinct dimensions. On the one
hand, funders are concerned about whether sellers are
competent enough to finish the product on time. On
the other hand, funders fear that project initiators are
not motivated to deliver high quality products. Based
on these distinct features, we define seller uncertainty
in the crowdfunding contexts as seller’s opportunism
(ex ante) and seller’s competence (ex post).
Previous research, especially e-business research,
has mainly focused on seller uncertainty, whereas
product uncertainty has not been studied extensively
[12]. Limited number of existing studies reported the
positive effect of seller uncertainty on product
uncertainty [12]. Two types of product uncertainty
have drawn attention from scholars: performance
uncertainty and product fit [19]. Performance
uncertainty captures how well the finished product
will perform as described initially. Product fit
captures the match between product attributes and the
expectations of the buyer and whether the buyer will
have a positive experience with the product after the
purchase. These two aspects of product uncertainty
are considered distinct [19]. In this study, we
examine product performance uncertainty which is
closely related to seller uncertainty. Following the
literature, we posit the positive effect of seller
uncertainty on product uncertainty. That is;
H1a: Other things being equal, sellercompetence-uncertainty will increase product
performance uncertainty.
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H1b: Other things being equal, selleropportunism-uncertainty will increase product
performance uncertainty.

2.3 The Moderating Role of Product
Complexity
Previous research has shown that when product
complexity increases, consumers perceive higher
levels of uncertainty [21]. In the current study, we
postulate that when making decisions in a
crowdfunding environment, funders usually face both
types of seller uncertainties simultaneously, and they
interact and exert influence during the decisionmaking process. Thus, investigating the dynamics of
SOU and SCU with regards to complexity can
provide a more complete understanding of the effect
of seller uncertainty on product uncertainty.
Existing research reports that when people believe
they can control their decision making process, they
overestimate their decision performance. This
phenomenon is denoted as “illusion of control”
[11][22]. In the crowdfunding context, when product
complexity is low, funders may have the “illusion of
control” because the skills/capability needed to
accomplish such project is not as challenging for the
seller. As a result, funders may perceive low seller
competence uncertainty. Yet, seller opportunism
uncertainty may still play an important role when
product complexity is low since it is related to the
seller’s ethical nature, not to the product’s features,
although the level of such uncertainty may be lower
compared to the high complexity situation. In other
words, the “illusion of control” occurs when funders
either have a good understanding of the product or
the product itself is relatively easy to manufacture. In
either case, due to illusion of control, funders’ main
concern on sellers’ capability may not be as salient as
the concern on sellers’ opportunistic behaviors to
deliver low quality products.
For instance, if the crowdfunding project is a
photo album by a photographer, the perceived
product complexity would be low and the quality of
the photo album is more likely to be dependent on the
photographer’s intentions (e.g., will she finish the
photo album) rather her capabilities (e.g., can she
take the photos and make a book out of them). On the
other hand, the concern about seller’s competence
arises when the product complexity is high. In these
situation, funders’ lack of knowledge about the

product raises concern regarding the sellers’
capability of delivering the products as promised.
We argue that there is a distinction between the
sources of these two types of uncertainties. In seller
opportunism uncertainty, decision maker’s main
concern is the uncertainty as a result of seller’s
opportunism; whereas in seller competence
uncertainty, the decision maker focuses on the
attributes and specification of products. In other
words, under different levels of project complexity
and innovativeness, the nature of concerns on sellers’
uncertainty is different. One should notice that the
distinctive features of SOU and SCU does not
suggest that individuals experience only one type of
uncertainty, instead, they concern both seller’s
opportunism and seller’s competence, and their
magnitude varies under different levels of project
complexity. Parallel to these discussions, we
hypothesize that:
H2a: Other things being equal, in high product
complexity, SCU will have a more positive effect than
SOU on product performance uncertainty.
H2b: Other things being equal, in low product
complexity, SOU will have a more positive effect than
SCU on product performance uncertainty.

3. Methods
The survey questions used in the study are all
validated by the previous research. Each construct is
briefly described as follow.
Seller Uncertainty Based on the conceptualization,
seller uncertainty construct has two dimensions:
seller competence uncertainty and seller opportunism
uncertainty. Seller competence uncertainty items are
adapted from previous research [15][30], which
mainly focus on funder’s perceived uncertainty
towards seller’s capability to deliver a satisfied
product. Seller opportunism uncertainty items
measure the perceived uncertainty of whether sellers
can faithfully finish the projects with high quality.
These questions are also adapted from existing
studies [12][30].
Product Uncertainty: Product uncertainty is
measured as the perceived uncertainty about future
quality or performance of the product. It captures
perceptions of funders of the quality and performance
of the product with respect to project description [30].
Project Complexity: Consistent with previous
research on task complexity [21], we first select
different types of projects including both experience
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goods and search goods. Projects that may need
certain level of expertise to accurately assess product
features, such as a 3D printing device, are deemed as
a high complexity project. On the other hand,
projects that may be evaluated with less professional
knowledge, such as creating a photo album, are
considered as a low complexity project. The
perceived project complexity is measured by a 7point Likert scale. If the mean is less than 3.5, the
project is considered low complexity, if the mean is
more than 3.5, the project is considered high
complexity. Furthermore, in order to find the
products which correctly represent complexity level,
we conducted a pilot study to screen the most
appropriate products. In the pilot study, six different
products (three high complexity; three low
complexity) were shown to and evaluated by subject.
The product rated with the highest complexity level
is chosen as the high complexity project (3D printer),
and similarly product rated with the lowest
complexity level is used as the low complexity
project (photo album).
The data for the current study is obtained through
Amazon Mechanical Turk (MT). Compared to
traditional student samples used in decision making
research, subjects recruited via MT are more
demographically representative, and therefore ensure
the generalizability of the findings. Previous research
also found that common issues in experiment design
such as internal (e.g. subjects’ attentiveness) and
external validity (e.g. results persistency in other
experiment settings) do not constitute problems in
data collected from MT subjects [7]. Because
crowdfunding is not legal in all countries, we limit
MT subjects to the United States and Canada.
Moreover, to ensure high quality response from MT,
we required that subjects must have high acceptance
rate (> 95%) from previous tasks on MT, and also
added random attention check questions.
In sum, 326 subjects are recruited from MT.
Among them, 19 failed the attention check which
results in a final 307 valid answers, and for each valid
answer, a participant were paid $0.70 as a reward.
Among all of the 307 subjects, 163 (53.1%) were
male, 144 (46.9%) were female. The average age of
the subjects is in the 45-50 range. In general, subjects
are satisfied with social media platforms (e.g.
Facebook) (mean: 5.21/7) and online transactions
(e.g. online payment, e-commerce) (mean: 5.92/7),
and most of them are relatively familiar with
crowdfunding platform such as Kickstarter (mean:
4.74/7). Moreover, perceived project complexity is

tested again to confirm the results of the pilot study.
The results of the t-test show that there is a
significant difference (p < .001) between perceived
complexity of a photo album project (mean: 2.98/7)
(low complexity) and a 3D printer project (mean:
5.43/7) (high complexity).

4. Results
We used path model analysis to test the
hypotheses of the current study. Our analysis shows
that under both scenarios (low vs. high), seller
competence uncertainty and seller opportunism
uncertainty have significant positive effect on
product performance uncertainty. For the low
complexity project, seller competence uncertainty is
positively correlated with product performance
uncertainty (β = 0.31, p < .01), and seller
opportunism uncertainty is positively correlated with
product performance uncertainty (β = 0.50, p < .01).
For the high complexity project, seller competence
uncertainty is positively correlated with product
performance uncertainty (β = 0.20, p < .01), and
seller opportunism uncertainty is positively correlated
with product performance uncertainty (β = 0.63, p
< .01). These results support H1a and H1b.
To test the moderating effect of product
complexity (H2a & H2b), we compare the paths
coefficients within each scenario (low or high).
Within scenario comparison shows that in the low
complexity scenario, the path coefficient of seller
competence uncertainty to product uncertainty (β =
0.31, p < .01) is smaller than the path coefficient of
seller opportunism uncertainty to product uncertainty
(β = 0.50, p < .01). This result indicates that subjects
perceive stronger seller opportunism uncertainty than
seller competence uncertainty when evaluating low
complexity product, therefore supporting H2a.
However, contrary to our expectations, in high
complexity scenario subjects also perceive stronger
seller opportunism uncertainty (β = 0.63, p < .01)
than seller competence uncertainty β = 0.20, p < .01).
Thus H2b is not supported. Compared to low
complexity scenario, it seems that seller opportunism
uncertainty is even stronger in high complexity
scenario, and furthermore the seller competence
uncertainty decreases. This result may due to a halo
effect, under which if people consider a project is
complicated, their concern can spill over to sellers’
ethics. We further investigated this unexpected result
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in our post-hoc analysis. These results are shown in
Table 1.
Product Complexity
Path
Low
High
SCU  PU
0.31
0.20
SOU  PU
0.50
0.63
Table 1. Path coefficients

4.1 Post-hoc analysis
To further understand the dynamics between
seller opportunism uncertainty and seller competence
uncertainty under different levels of project
complexity, we compare the coefficients of the same
path across different scenarios (between low & high)
using group analysis.
The group analysis is conducted using a
permutation method developed by [10]. Based on
path coefficients and standard errors, t value is
obtained by using the following formula:
𝑡=

𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1 − 𝑃𝑎𝑡ℎ𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2
(𝑛−1)2
(𝑚−1)2
1 1
2
[√(𝑚+𝑛−2)∗𝑆.𝐸.2
𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒1 + (𝑚+𝑛−2)∗ 𝑆.𝐸.𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒2 ]∗[√𝑚+𝑛]

Utilizing this method, we find that there is a
significant difference (p < .05) between the path
coefficients of seller opportunism uncertainty to
product uncertainty (i.e. the increase from 0.50 to
0.63 is significant), and a marginally significant
difference (p < .1) (i.e. the decrease from 0.31 to 0.20)
is found between path coefficients of seller
competence uncertainty to product uncertainty. The
results seem to imply that funders’ concern on project
initiators’ opportunism behaviors increases while the
project complexity becomes high, and it is even
becoming funders’ major concern and may start to
ignore whether project initiators have the capability
to deliver the products.
As discussed, contrary to expectations, our result
shows that seller competence uncertainty has a
smaller effect for inferring product quality when
project complexity increases. One factor that may
lead to this phenomenon is funders’ familiarity with
the product. For example, when people have the
knowledge of a certain product, they may understand
the required level of expertise to build an excellent
product. On the other hand, when people are
unfamiliar with the product, they may not have the
ability to assess project initiators’ capability, rather
they may forego their concern on sellers’ competence
and focus on sellers’ opportunism behaviors, which
they can try to infer based on the information
provided. In order to verify our speculation, we

conduct the within scenario t-test to compare the
level of perceived seller competence uncertainty. For
the high complexity project, people who are more
familiar with the product indeed perceive more seller
competence uncertainty compared to people who are
unfamiliar with a 3D printer (= 4.32 vs.  = 3.88, p
<.05). In other words, they are more aware of the
existence of sellers’ competence uncertainty. This
speculation is also confirmed in low complexity
scenario. For the Photo Album project, funders who
claim to be more familiar with the project has a
higher concern on sellers’ competence (= 3.56)
compared to funders who are less familiar with the
project (= 3.14), and a significant difference is also
observed (p < .05).

5. Discussion
This study aims to examine how funders’ decision
making process is affected due to perception of
different types of seller uncertainties. Specifically,
we investigate the effects of seller opportunism and
seller competence uncertainty on product uncertainty,
as well as the dynamics between these two types
seller of uncertainty under different levels of product
complexity. We find that funders experience two
distinct types of seller uncertainty, and their effect on
product uncertainty varies by project complexity.
Some of the key findings of the study are as follows.
First, under either high or low project complexity,
funders concern more about sellers’ opportunistic
behaviors, and less about sellers’ capability to deliver
a good quality product. Furthermore, when project
complexity increases, the effect of seller’s
opportunism uncertainty on funders’ evaluation of
potential products is significantly higher, compared
to the same effect when complexity level is low.
These results seem to imply that when the project
becomes complex, funders do not evaluate the quality
of potential products based upon project initiators’
capability, rather funders will “by default”
acknowledge and believe that project initiators have
the expertise to accomplish the projects. This is
especially the case for funders who are not familiar
with the product. According to funders’ perceptions,
whether the delivered products will possess good
quality mainly depends on project initiators’ good
faith.
Our findings have several implications. Compared
to previous research which mainly focuses on seller’s
ethical characteristics [12][30], this study proposes
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that seller competence uncertainty may independently
exert influence on perceived product uncertainty.
Moreover, although different types of seller
uncertainty have been investigated in the literature,
these studies are mostly in the context of e-business
or at least for finished products, whereas in a
crowdfunding context, it is important to investigate
funders’ uncertainty regarding sellers’ competence of
delivering satisfactory products, because the decision
maker is not only a buyer but also an investor of a
product which is yet to be manufactured. Therefore,
in addition to sellers’ ethnical characteristics, the
product performance uncertainty experienced by
funders can also be affected by sellers’ competence.
Furthermore, the magnitude of seller uncertainty
perceived by people are significantly different.
Especially for high complexity products, people have
a stronger concern about seller’s opportunistic
behaviors, whereas they have less concern about
seller’ competence. The further investigation of our
unexpected result revealed that seller competence
uncertainty is partly determined by funders’
familiarity of the product. Those who have
familiarity with the product have more concerns of
seller competence both in high and low product
complexity, highlighting the complexity of
understanding decision-making process.
This research also has practical implications. As
discussed in the beginning, the urgent issue faced by
all crowdfunding platforms is that there might be too
many “disqualified” projects, where funders do not
have access to all information, especially the
crowdfunding website 1) does not have a supervisory
system to monitor the quality of the finished product;
and 2) provides low barriers to entry. Combined with
these issues, people already started to have negative
impacts on crowdfunding due to their unsatisfactory
decisions on failed projects. The negative attitude
towards crowdfunding could further hurt the platform
since crowdfunding websites could make a profit
only when projects are successfully funded. The
findings of our current research may guide future
features of crowdfunding platforms. One the one
hand, crowdfunding websites should enforce
administrative mechanism to supervise and inspect to
filter out disqualified projects, on the other hand,
crowdfunding platforms could integrate social
networking sites into current functions in order to
assist funders with their decision making. For
examples, if funders are able to obtain opinions from
other fellow funders, or share their investing
activities with friends to receive comments on the

crowdfunding platform, funders may retrieve extra
information to help them formulate decision. As
people become more satisfied with their choices, they
would reinvest on the platform, which also benefits
the platform. Given that most of popular projects on
the crowdfunding platforms are high-tech products,
which
accompanied
by
high
complexity,
crowdfunding platforms may disclose more
information about project initiators and their
credentials.
Although the research tries to account for
extensive
aspects
of
study
design
and
conceptualization, it also has limitation. One
limitation is due to subjects’ geographic
characteristics. The sample of this study is mainly
from North America, therefore there might be a
cultural bias. It is widely known that uncertainty
avoidance and the development of trust is closely
related to national culture [13]. Since the current
study is conducted predominantly in one type of
culture, it would be constructive to test the same
model in different countries, or under another cultural
background. In the future research, we would like to
examine the influence of such variables, which may
include culture, gender and age, on the perception of
different types of seller uncertainties, especially when
these variables interact with the project complexity.

6. Conclusion
We now live in an era that everyone is connected
by Internet, where social media plays an important
role in our daily life. On the one hand, people are
enjoying the convenience of abundant information
existing on the Internet, and on the other hand, people
are burdening with the possibility of information
overload which causes difficulty in making decisions.
How to effectively using and evaluating the
information is becoming a major concern today
compared to difficulties of lack of information
experienced in the past. In a crowdfunding
environment, people have to decide between many
similar products in a situation where most of the time
they are not familiar with the project initiators or
their innovative products. Therefore, they have to
depend on certain benchmarks to confirm or validate
their decisions. Current research provides new
insights on funders’ decision making mechanism, and
how crowdfunding platforms can help funders to
reduce their concern.
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As a consequence of rapid development of
Internet and innovative use of such technology,
people are constantly facing new challenge when
making decisions. It is important to accurately
identify what our question is and why we have such
concerns. By examining the influence of different
types of seller uncertainty, we can establish a more
comprehensive understanding of who will be offering
the products/services, and how they will manufacture
and deliver their products/services, which may help
us evaluate such products/services better.
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